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In re Zhu: Implied Consent to Posthumous
Sperm Retrieval
Mary Kathryn Sapp*
I.
A.

INTRODUCTION

Presentation of the Controversy

In 1980, an American doctor became the first physician to retrieve
sperm from a brain-dead man using a procedure called posthumous sperm
retrieval (PSR).1 Although it remains an uncommon procedure, requests for
PSR have increased in recent years, sparking debates about the ethical and
legal permissibility of posthumous sperm retrieval.2 There are various methods by which doctors may posthumously retrieve sperm, including direct extraction using a needle.3 Once the physician retrieves the sperm, a
reproductive facility may freeze and store it until the relevant parties decide
what to do with the sperm.4
In In re Zhu,5 the New York Supreme Court (Westchester County)
granted a deceased man’s parents full authority to decide the ultimate disposition of their son’s sperm, including its potential use for future procreative
purposes.6 Even though the decedent had not expressed his intent on the subject of PSR while he was alive, the court relied on the decedent’s registration
as an organ donor and his past statements and actions in its finding of the
decedent’s “presumed intent” that his parents were the proper party to make
determinations about the ultimate disposition of his sperm.7 Over the past
few decades, posthumous sperm retrieval has sparked an ethical debate centered on the acceptability of this procedure given concerns about the proper
requirement of consent.8 This case is important because it was a case of first
impression for New York courts and signals a need for updated legislation
governing PSR.9
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Factual Background

At the time of his accident, Peter Zhu was a 21-year-old West Point
Cadet scheduled to graduate in only a few months when he suffered severe
spinal injuries while skiing on the West Point Campus.10 First responders
transported Peter to a nearby hospital where doctors later declared him brain
dead.11 Because he had signed an organ donation card, doctors kept Peter on
life support until the scheduled date for his organ removal.12 The morning
that Peter’s organ donation surgery was to take place, his parents filed a
motion with the court requesting immediate relief.13 PSR is only successful if
doctors retrieve the sperm within 24–48 hours of the man’s death.14 Although
the hospital said that it was neither in favor of nor opposed to the PSR procedure, it asked that the court give an order directing the procedure before it
proceeded.15 The hospital did not have any guidelines covering this
scenario.16
Two facts from the parents’ petition were of central importance in the
court’s ultimate holding: (1) Peter registered as an organ donor; and (2) Peter
had periodically expressed his desire to one day have a family of his own.17
In their petition, Peter’s parents explained their request in terms of their son’s
lifelong wish to be a father, the cultural importance of continuing the family
legacy, and as a remedy for their own personal grief.18
The case came before the court as a motion to show cause, with the
parents requesting (1) immediate relief in the form of a direct order asking
the hospital to perform the PSR procedure; and (2) granting the parents authority to decide on the matter.19 The court granted the request for immediate
relief and a fertility clinic stored Peter’s sperm while the parents awaited the
court’s holding on the second issue.20
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

PSR is not regulated in the United States.21 A New York State Senator
put forth the only proposed legislation on the matter in 1998, but the state
legislature never submitted the bill to a vote.22 Today, doctors accept or deny
requests for PSR on a case-by-case basis, and they usually only grant requests in response to a court order.23 Some hospitals have put forth guidelines meant to aid doctors in responding to requests for PSR.24 Such
guidelines cover topics related to PSR such as the recommended timing for
the procedure relative to the patient’s death, acceptable methods of retrieval,
and acceptable parties who may request the procedure.25
Some argue that the Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)
governs sperm retrieval in the United States.26 In 2018, the Ethics Committee
of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) published
guidelines on posthumous retrieval and use of gametes or embryos.27 According to the ASRM, PSR is “ethically justifiable” if there is “written documentation from the deceased authoriz[ing] it.”28 If no such documented
authorization exists, the ASRM says that hospitals should only consider requests from “the surviving spouse or life partner.”29
Two cases coming out of California have served as general guidelines
for addressing legal issues surrounding the disposition of a decedent’s sperm;
however, these cases involve sperm that the decedent had deposited and
stored in a sperm bank and they do not address the retrieval of sperm directly
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from a decedent’s body.30 In In re Estate of Kievernagel, a California appellate court faced a widow’s efforts to claim her deceased husband’s sperm as
her own property, despite the decedent’s written request that his sperm,
which he had deposited in a sperm bank while he was alive, ought to be
destroyed upon his death.31 In rejecting the widow’s efforts to claim the
sperm as her own, the court relied on the decedent’s intent as he expressed it
in writing during his lifetime.32 In Hecht v. Kane, a separate California court
of appeal relied on the decedent’s expressed consent that his sperm “be
stored for possible future use by his longtime girlfriend,” despite efforts by
the decedent’s children to destroy the decedent’s frozen sperm.33 In both California cases, each court prioritized the respective decedent’s expressed
wishes concerning the ultimate disposition of his sperm and characterized a
decedent’s interest in his sperm as a unique, quasi-property like interest.34
Neither California court opinion involved PSR as a procedure effected directly upon the decedent; rather, each case dealt with the disposition of sperm
that the decedent deposited and stored in a sperm bank while he was alive.35
This approach seems to represent the consensus amongst American courts
where a decedent’s interest in the disposition of his sperm after his death is
most analogous to property rights, but amounts to something more intimate
and personal to his personal identity compared to his interest in other organs
or tissues that may be donated.36
In re Daniel Thomas Christy represents the sole case cited by the In re
Zhu court that deals with PSR procedures.37 In this case, the parents of the
decedent framed their request for the procedure as necessary to effectuate an
“anatomical gift” of the sperm to the decedent’s surviving fiancée.38 The
Iowa court in that case used Iowa laws of intestacy to justify the parents’
30.
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request for the PSR procedure and subsequent storage of the sperm.39 The
court permitted the parents “to make an ‘anatomical gift’ of it to decedent’s
fiancé, for possible future procreative use.”40
The most on point precedent comes from Texas, where a court granted a
mother’s request for her son to undergo PSR and ordered the hospital to
retrieve viable sperm from the decedent.41 The decedent’s mother described
her request to perform the PSR procedure as motivated by a desire to fulfil
her son’s dream of becoming a father one day, despite his sudden death.42
This case is distinct from the aforementioned cases because it involves PSR
and it also does not involve a surviving partner’s desire to carry the decedent’s child; rather, the decedent’s mother in In re Christy planned on finding
a third-party surrogate to provide the egg and carry a viable embryo.43 Although this is the most relevant existing case law, the In re Zhu court did not
consider this scenario in its opinion.44
A.

Critical Issue

The court held the parents were the proper party to decide the ultimate
disposition of Peter’s sperm. Because Peter never expressed an opinion on
the matter of PSR, the court relied on Peter’s “presumed intent” in reaching
its conclusion. The court gleaned this presumed intent from Peter’s status as
an organ donor, coupled with his parents’ and teacher’s testimony regarding
Peter’s lifelong wish to become a father. The court also relied on two statutes
as an aid in determining Peter’s presumed intent. Where it relies on a policy
of presumed consent, this decision treats a PSR procedure similar to an organ
donation procedure. However, the parents relied on anecdotal evidence that
does not establish Peter’s presumed intent to PSR should he die.45
B.

Legal Analysis

In In re Zhu, the New York Supreme Court (Westchester County)
granted the parents of a deceased young man full authority to decide what to
do with their son’s sperm.46 That the court analogized PSR with organ dona-
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tion is further supported by the statutes it cited to support its finding.47 Ethically speaking, the court divided the decision into two parts: first, approving
the retrieval of sperm and, second, approving the use of the sperm for subsequent uses.48 The Court phrased the issue in In re Zhu as: “who, if anyone
should be given the authority to determine the disposition of Peter’s genetic
material, now preserved in the sperm bank.”49
The basis of the court’s holding in favor of Peter’s parents lies in its
characterization of a decedent’s sperm as legally analogous to the rest of the
decedent’s organs and tissues for purposes of deciding who may decide the
disposition of the sperm after the man has died.50 This characterization of
sperm as legally equivalent to other organs and tissues is evidenced where
the court adopted the In re Christy court’s characterization of a decedent’s
sperm as an anatomical gift.51 This explains the court’s reliance on evidence
pertaining to Peter’s status as an organ donor and his desire to carry on his
family legacy, coupled with the court’s citing of the New York version of the
UAGA and New York intestacy laws.52 The logic of the court’s holding is
essentially: because Peter was an organ donor who adored his parents and
longed to have a family of his own one day to carry on his cultural tradition,
“Peter evinced an intent to leave for future disposition rather than destroy
certain bodily parts, tissues, and by extension, bodily fluids that survived
him” and that “the disposition of Peter’s genetic material be made in the first
instance by his parents.”53
III.
A.

PRACTICAL ANALYSIS & IMPLICATION

Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

Given the underlying facts of the case, it was inappropriate for the court
to grant Peter’s parents unrestricted authority to decide the ultimate disposition of Peter’s sperm. In analyzing cases conserving PSR, two issues stand
out as necessary to address: (1) what level of consent must the court require
before granting requests for PSR; and (2) who can request the procedure.54
The answer to both questions is informed by a review of existing case law
and state statutes; both suggest that the existing law is inapplicable to the
47.

See id. at 779–80.
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facts present in In re Zhu and there is a need for legislative clarity on PSR.55
Whatever the merit of presumed intent may be in factually distinct contexts,
a presumption of consent is not permissible in the PSR context where, as in
In re Zhu, the requests come from the parents of the decedent and the decedent had made no explicit statements or actions which would support such a
presumption of intent.56
In the ethical debate regarding consent as it relates to PSR, there is a
recognized stance that PSR procedures should not occur “outside the context
of a committed romantic relationship without the prior consent of the deceased to donating gametes to a stranger for that purpose.”57 In the debate
over consent, one might characterize the three main positions as: restrictive,
permissive, and hybrid.58 However, all approaches agree on one thing: “some
form of premortem consent of the decedent is required.”59 The restrictive
view “requires that the decedent must have executed an advance directive
‘that indicates explicitly his or her willingness to have the procedure performed in these specific circumstances.’”60 A more intermediate approach
would merely require “reasonably inferred consent” of the decedent before
allowing PSR.61 Those who oppose inferred consent cite a fear that such
conclusions about a decedent’s presumed consent would be “colored by the
interests, motivations, and purposes of those who are seeking to use the
sperm.”62
1.

Under these Facts, Presumed Intent is Inappropriate Basis for
the Decedent’s Consent

First, the court’s holding is incorrect because it did not establish Peter’s
presumed intent. Thus, the court should have limited Peter’s parents’ use of
the sperm to non-procreative uses.63 Even granting that presumed intent is an
acceptable standard, the court did not establish Peter’s consent to PSR.64 Peter’s status as an organ donor was not enough to establish his presumed intent
to have his parents possess full authority to decide about the ultimate disposi55.
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56.
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tion of his sperm.65 This is because PSR is distinct from organ donation in
several respects. Organ donation and PSR differ such that the same rules of
consent should not govern both. Distinctions between the procedures “relate
. . . to the nature of the procreation itself” and “the nature of the process
involved.”66 The two procedures differ in their purpose; whereas the purpose
of organ donation is to save lives, the purpose of PSR is to create new life.67
Whereas presumed consent is justifiable in the organ donation context, presumed consent to PSR violates the decedent’s reproductive autonomy.68
Although the court cited to Hecht and In re Estate of Kievernagel to
show the primary importance of the decedent’s intent in this inquiry, the
court did not acknowledge the fundamental factual differences that distinguish the matters in In re Zhu from those present in the existing case law.69
Presumed consent regarding organ donation gathers support because of a societal need for organ donations, which are valuable to society.70 Under the
UAGA, even if the decedent did not register as an organ donor, the next of
kin may permit organ donation so long as the donation does not go against
any explicit wishes or religious views held by the decedent during his
lifetime.71
The facts of In re Zhu do not include the fundamental facts present in
Hecht, In re Estate of Kievernagel, and In re Daniel Thomas Christy that
permit a presumption of consent to PSR.72 Unlike the existing case law, Peter
made no representations about his wishes regarding the disposition of his
sperm in the event of his death, he had not donated his sperm to a sperm
bank, and he had no surviving spouse.73 These facts would have lent support
to the appropriateness of presumed intent. The court established that Peter
consented to his parents deciding about the disposition of his sperm if someone had to make that decision.74 However, the court erred in granting the
immediate request for relief.75 A proper analysis by the court would have
65.
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66.
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67.
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69.
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Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 312–13 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2008);
Hecht v. Kane, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 838 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1993).
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taken into account the fundamental differences between Peter’s situation and
the existing case law and conclude that Peter’s parents had failed to establish
the requisite intent of the decedent.76
There are serious conflicts of interest in a situation of PSR requested by
a decedent’s parents that do not exist in situations of presumed intent with
organ donations permitted by the decedent’s parents.77 The term “postmortem grandparenthood” describes situations where, for example, parents
of a deceased request the post-mortem sperm retrieval.78 Regarding such requests by parents of the deceased, most people think parents lack “any ethical
claim to their child’s gametes.”79 One major concern in cases of post-mortem
grandparenthood is that parents will, intentionally or not, overstate their
child’s past statements about having kids one day, perhaps even describing
their quest for PSR as motivated by a desire to accomplish their son’s
dream.80 Thus, the medical community faces a massive moral dilemma: “how
should a request for retrieval be handled if it is made not by the spouse of the
decedent but by his partner, parents, or by his surviving children?”81
2.

Existing Statutes Do Not Apply to the Circumstances in In re
Zhu

The court relied on provisions of the New York Public Health Law
(PHL) and the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) for guidance on interpreting the decedent’s presumed intent.82 Section 4301 of the PHL (“Persons
who may execute an anatomical gift”) states that “any individual of sound
mind and eighteen years of age or more may give all or any part of his or her
body for any purpose specified in section forty-three hundred two of this
article, the gift to take effect upon death.”83 Section 4302 of the PHL is called
“Persons who may become donees and purposes for which anatomical gifts
may be made.”84 This section states that “the following persons may become
donees of gifts or bodies or parts thereof for the purposes stated: . . . 3. any
bank or storage facility, for medical or dental education, research, advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation.”85 Although the
PHL permits the court to allow the anatomical gift to go to the sperm bank or
76.

Id.

77.

Hostiuc, supra note 14, at 434.

78.

Gan-Or, supra note 54, at 114.

79.
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80.
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storage facility, the issue lies in the permissible purpose where none of the
options seem to cover the purpose for which the Zhus had requested to use
the sperm—e.g., potential future reproductive use.86 Because the Zhus did
not have a specific recipient in mind for the “anatomical gift,” it seems like a
stretch to say that the PHL governs here.
As for the applicability of the EPTL, the court described section 4-1.1 of
the EPTL as “set[ting] forth the order in which those connected to the decedent take his or her property in the absence of a Will.”87 On a similar note,
the court cited In re Daniel Thomas Christy for the proposition that the court
“relied solely upon the Iowa laws of intestacy to authorize the recovery and
storage of decedent’s sperm by his parents, and to permit them to make an
‘anatomical gift’ of it to decedent’s fiancé, presumably for possible future
procreative use.”88 Again, this intestacy statute seems inapplicable to PSR,
where there is no evidence that the decedent intended for anyone to be the
recipient of his sperm after his death.89 The court seems to limit its understanding of the decedent’s interest in his sperm after his death to a property
interest, without taking into consideration the unique, personal properties that
distinguish sperm from other organs and tissues.90
Taken together, a survey of relevant case law and state statutes shows
that existing New York statutes are inapplicable to circumstances such as
those present in In re Zhu. Thus, this case shows the need for clear legislation
on the subject to aid courts in making these difficult decisions.91
B.

Loose Ends

The author suggests that the New York State Legislature reconsider the
bill brought forth by New York State Senator Roy Goodman in 1998. This
bill proposed to “ban PSR unless the decedent gave explicit written consent
prior to his death and to require that the request only be granted if the spouse
or partner of the deceased requested the procedure.”92 This seems to be the
most appropriate legislation at the moment, when PSR is still a rare procedure; such a law would satisfy notice requirements for decedents and would
aid healthcare professionals in their decision-making.

86.

In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 781.

87.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, In re Zhu represents a departure from existing precedent
on the subject of PSR because it rests on a much weaker evidentiary basis
and the court decides based on the decedent’s “presumed intent.”93 This case
also shows the need for clear state legislation regulating PSR so that grieving
families may take advantage of this advancement in reproductive science
without navigating the legislative void any longer.94
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